European Election Results 2024: What Does the Rise of Far-Right Parties Mean for EU Dynamics and Policy?

8 min readJun 10, 2024

The centre holds in the European Parliament (EP), with the European Peoples’ Party (EPP) and Socialists and Democrats (S&D) maintaining the strongest positions. But gains from the right undermine governments in major capitals, such as Berlin and Paris. What could the greater influence of the far-right parties mean for EU institutional dynamics and EU policy areas?

Europe’s right starts the week celebrating, while the liberal and left-leaning politicians and voters are waking up with headaches. The Greens and the liberal Renew (RE) lost a combined total of around 40 seats, while the far-right Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID) together gained 13 seats. The centre-right EPP added a respectable ten seats, while the S&D lost a few.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and her EPP emerge as the strongest single group and can claim to have tempered the surge of parties farther to the right. Now she may try to strike a deal with old coalition partners S&D and RE, which would yield a paper-thin majority for her re-election as Commission President.

The alternative is to explore options with the ECR, comprised mainly of Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, who has been making inroads with von der Leyen recently, and a weakened Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, which supported her last presidency but may not be so willing this time around.

We have four takes from our Europe experts on what the election results mean for the political character of the European Parliament, dynamics between EU institutions and implications in certain policy areas.

The Good, the Bad and the Uncertain

By Malte Zabel

The election result is not surprising, but it is remarkable. There are arguments in favour of the ‘glass half full’ and ‘glass half empty’ perspectives (more of the latter, I’m afraid…). And there are also several uncertainties, the outcome of which we cannot yet fully predict.

The good: Apparently, voter turnout has increased, and the democratic centre still has a stable parliamentary majority. The predicted shift to the right happened, but it could have been even heavier. For example, the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), achieved a strong result but, contrary to some polls, did not win the election in the Netherlands.

Furthermore, for the first time in what felt like an eternity, the PiS was not Poland’s strongest force. Victor Orbán’s Fidesz has remained below 50 percent for the first time in more than a decade and is facing a new, serious challenger. Finding majorities might become more volatile, but the European Parliament is not caught in a stalemate.

The bad: Nonetheless, the shift to the right remains significant, with the results in France and Italy standing out. Right-wing parties won in five member states — France, Italy, Austria, Belgium and Hungary — and made big gains in others. In the eastern German states, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) clearly became the strongest party, way ahead of the Christian Democrats, which won the elections in the other parts of Germany.

In total, the ECR and ID parliamentary groups gained 13 seats, while also some of the almost 100 non-attached MEPs come from right-wing parties. As well as increased parliamentary influence, the success of right-wing populist parties makes an impact at national level and therefore on the European Council (EUCO).

France faces political uncertainty following Macron’s snap election announcement after the historic win of the National Rally (RN). The German result does not give the Chancellor any support. A Franco-German leadership role in the EUCO, which has hardly materialised recently anyway, is no more likely after these elections.

Another fly in the ointment is that the campaigns were again predominantly national — mostly a deliberate political strategy. This does not do justice to the importance of the European elections, especially as it is now virtually impossible to separate national and European issues.

The uncertainties: Three questions stand out:

Will the majorities change? The old von der Leyen coalition of EPP, S&D and Renew has 402 votes. Even with a dissent rate of 10 percent, this would be just enough for an absolute majority needed to elect the Commission President. But the key question is whether the EPP will seek to close ranks with individual ECR parties such as the Czech Civil Democratic Party (ODS) and — more controversially — the Brothers of Italy. This depends on the topic, such as economic policy issues which rank very high on the EPP’s list of priorities, and would certainly affect the willingness of the S&D and Renew to cooperate with the EPP. Talks this week, which will primarily focus on the election of the top personnel, will likely be an early indicator.
What happens next in France? The situation in France is worrisome and Macron’s decision is very risky. If he loses the election and cannot disenchant Marine LePen in the 2027 French presidential election, his decision will be a double boomerang with significant consequences for Europe’s political capacity to act.
What will happen to right-wing groups? A formal merger of the two existing political groups is still unlikely. The sometimes-diametrically opposed positions on Russia and the war in Ukraine stand in the way. But movement within the camps is likely, if only because many right-wing MEPs are still non-attached, including Hungary’s Fidesz and Germany’s AfD. Against this backdrop, it is theoretically possible to form a third right-wing parliamentary group, albeit with high formal hurdles, including recruiting at least 23 MEPs from at least seven different EU member states.

Will the Economic Security Toolbox Go Back on the Shelf?

By Cora Jungbluth

The EU has just started to position itself as a geopolitical player in the past five years. Only recently, economic security has climbed to the top of its agenda — which is something of a novelty for the bloc that has traditionally focused on trade. It has thoroughly overhauled its trade defence toolbox and introduced the notion of systemic rivalry vis-à-vis China and others.

To continue this course and really put this economic security focus into practice requires the EU and member states to pull together and act in unity more than ever before. No single member state has the political and economic weight to achieve equal geopolitical footing with the US and China. The EU together at least stands a chance.

The results of the election, however, might weaken the willingness to achieve concerted and coordinated action at EU level. Therefore, this could, in turn, jeopardise the efficient use and further enhancement of the EU’s economic security toolbox in the coming legislature.

Right-wing and populist parties have scored high in many member states. They tend to oppose yielding political power and decision-making to the EU in general — and to favour a more lenient approach towards Russia and China. This shift in focus might affect the behaviour of member states in EU institutions, especially those member states where the right-leaning parties polled strongly.

The incoming Parliament and Commission should — and probably will — continue on the geopolitical course that von der Leyen has set for the EU, but they might be faced with much stronger hurdles and headwinds.

More Inward-Looking, Less Able to Trade?

By Etienne Höra

A coherent, effective trade agenda to reduce dependencies and diversify relationships is a key component of economic security — and pursuing such an agenda will likely become even more difficult following the elections.

The growing fragmentation of the European Parliament and the rise of right-wing populist forces, most of which promote economic nationalism, add to the EU’s latest challenges in negotiating and concluding trade agreements. This has become evident, not least, in the failure of the planned agreement with Australia, a likeminded partner in most respects — and this does not bode well for other ongoing negotiations.

An increasingly inward-looking EU may face even more difficulties in addressing its partners’ concerns and building constructive relationships, including sensitive areas, such as critical raw materials.

Another key development to watch is the future of agriculture in EU trade policy. Trade partners, especially in the Global South, have long criticised the EU’s high levels of protection and strict standards for imports tied to policies such as the Green Deal and the Farm to Fork strategy, which are perceived as hidden protectionist measures.

The coming EU Parliament will be less green, more protectionist and likely more sensitive to the farmers’ lobbying. This aspect of EU trade policy, which is closely linked to trade support for Ukraine in the form of tariff suspensions, may therefore see substantial reshaping.

Far-right Shift Complicates Challenges for EU’s Timid Industrial Policy

By Lucas Resende Carvalho

The EU is faced with multiple perils. To tackle these, ambitious strategic goals that will require massive, targeted investments have been set out. However, success is made all the more daunting by the EU’s sluggish economic growth and increasing global protectionism that exposes the vulnerabilities of its export-dependent economy.

To achieve these targets, the EU needs a coherent industrial policy framework that mediates the gap between private sector interests and the broader public good, addressing the strategic objectives that cannot be left to the market alone.

To complicate matters further, there is a disconnect between the EU’s ambitious industrial goals and its implementation. This is mainly due to the lack of public funding at the EU level. The absence of a comprehensive common budget along with a fragmented European industrial policy not only prevents the EU from achieving its strategic goals, but it creates division within the single market.

The sweeping success of austerity-focused, far-right parties threatens to further restrict direly needed green and growth-enhancing investments. Additionally, more austerity risks aggravating the vicious cycle of political and economic decline, fuelling the populist sentiments driven by poor economic performance across member states and regions.

Now, more than ever, Europe needs substantial green investment to manage its transition, overcome secular economic stagnation and regain its competitive edge on the global stage. While the election results have left some breathing room for the pro-European parties, the possible parliamentary majorities have now become even slimmer, complicating the political compromises needed for growth-driven investment and a future-oriented industrial policy.

Watch for Part 2, coming soon

We will publish another article soon with more insights into the outcome of the European Parliament election.

About the authors

Lucas Resende Carvalho is a Project Manager at the Bertelsmann Stiftung in the Europe’s Future Program.

Nathan Crist is Project Manager in the Europe’s Future Programme at the Bertelsmann Stiftung, working on the Europe’s Economy Project.

Etienne Höra is Project Manager in the ‘Europe’s Future’ programme at Bertelsmann Stiftung. His focus lies on the EU’s trade policy in this geoeconomic age, as well as the consequences of China’s increasing assertiveness for the EU.

Cora Jungbluth is Senior Expert in the Europe’s Future Programme at the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Her research focus is on China, foreign direct investment and international trade, especially the role of emerging economies.

Malte Zabel is Co-Director of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Europe’s Future Program, which pursues projects on the EU’s sovereignty, a coherent internal market and European public opinion.

Originally published at https://globaleurope.eu on June 10, 2024.